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Taking Apart the ‘Roads Ahead’: user power vs. the futurology of IT1 
GRAEME GOODAY 
 
How often have futurologists ever succeeded in making accurate global predictions? Bell’s utopian 
vision of a leisure-laden ‘Post-Industrial’ society now seems hopelessly naive;2  Fukuyama’s ‘End 
of history’ thesis was arguably just a fleeting Reaganite delusion about the stabilization of post 
Cold War politics.3 Notwithstanding the failure of such widely hailed prophesies, and despite the 
lack of any well-attested laws about the historical development of information technologies,4 a 
brazenly upbeat  futurology  pervades many debates on new IT. This is most obviously the case in 
Bill Gates’ recently updated The Road Ahead.5 To challenge Gates’ prognostications about the 
future of information technologies, I will argue for the importance of users (vis-à-vis producers) in 
the social shaping and ‘consumption’ of IT,  especially the power of many (if not necessarily all) 
such users to resist falling into futures that others prescribe for them. I contend that the non-
passivity of IT users undermines the cogency of any claims about the inevitability of technological 
change, and helps to explain why so many past ‘futures’ of IT have never fully materialized. 
 
1. The unpredicted and the badly predicted in the history of IT  
Technologies have often ended up being used in ways that their inventors and engineers did not 
foresee or perhaps did not actually wish. No one person ever seems to have foreseen all the possible 
ways in which a technology could be used, nor the social effects that its use might bring. Indeed the 
sociologists of technology, Trevor Pinch & Wiebe Bijker,6 have pointed out that the social function 
of a technology is not uniquely determined by its material construction: it is subject rather to 
‘interpretive flexibility.’ On this view, different social groups characteristically see different 
possibilities in the usage of a given technology and thus develop divergent social meanings and 
expectations for it - leaving the direction of its subsequent deveopment somewhat contigent. 
Looking at the early history of information technologies reveals for us just how haphazard their fate 
has proved to be. 
 
In the late 1860s and 1870s the submarine telegraph was heralded as the great peace-maker, 
allegedly destined to prevent future wars by enabling rapid and harmonious communication 
between nations. This technology was, however, appropriated by governments who harnessed it to 
their own belligerent ends, using the telegraph to create at least as many new conflicts of power 
around the imperial world as it helped to resolve.7 When the telephone was first marketed in the 
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late 1870s and 1880s it was as a speaking form of telegraph for businessmen, a parlour toy for 
wealthy, or (in Hungary and France) as a one-way device for point to point ‘broadcasting’ of 
opera.
the 
8 American telephone companies were actually irritated when women at home ‘trivialized’ 
this technology by used it for daily social conversation - until realization of the profitability of this 
unforeseen gendered usage!9 Marconi’s development of point-to-point ‘wireless telegraphy’ of 
1896 only came to be used for mass ‘radio’ broadcasting over two decades later as wireless 
manufacturers sought to create new audiences for their products after military demand fell away at 
the close of World War I.10 
 
The crucial problem for the futurology of any given technology revealed in these examples is that 
culturally important and lucrative uses for it are initially far from obvious to the makers and 
promoters of that technology. Consider the 1960s: who predicted that the computer might ever 
become a personalized vehicle of entertainment or communication? Computers are nowhere to be 
found in Marshall McLuhan’s pychedelic speculations about a technologically- wrought future 
democracy.11 The common view then was that a small number of centralized mainframe computers, 
with many peripheral terminals, would meet all computing needs - in programming, calculation and 
business data processing.12 If this mainframe-centred expectation of the future was not borne out, it 
was surely not due to the obtuseness nor unimaginativeness of computer specialists in the 1960s.13 
It owed more to the unforeseen, and probably unforeseeable, way in which electronics 
manufacturers in the 1970s constructed new audiences and technologies for personal computing on 
the back of a craze for personal digital (and programmable) calculators.14 
 
The most striking recent development in the history of information technology is the spectacular 
growth of the Internet. Yet this too was hardly predicted by users of its predecessor, the ARPANET 
in the 1970s, nor the WWW when it was created in 1989.15 Perhaps most remarkably of all, the 
sudden burst of interest in the Internet in the mid 1990s was contrary to the predictions of the most 
successful IT merchant of all time: Microsoft’s Bill Gates. In 1996 Gates had to rewrite his quasi-
autobiographical volume of The Road Ahead16 a mere year after it was first published in order to 
tell the story of how Microsoft had been forced to restructure its entire software business around the 
Internet during 1995-96. It would appear that the growth in importance of this most striking of all 
recent developments in information technology was not obviously predictable for IT experts at least 
until the major changes in public usage were actually underway anyway.  
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2. Laying down the Road Ahead: three incompatible approaches to IT forecasting 
The persistent fallibility of forecasts concerning information technology is often obscured by the 
ways in which bad predictions are often just quietly forgotten or quickly displaced by newer 
predictions. Such forecasts are rather like horoscopes: so long as a future - indeed any future - is 
available to give consumers or financial backers some clear sense of what can be achieved with a 
technological innovation, it hardly seems to matter how accurate the prediction turns out to be in 
the long run. Such predictions generally try to convince anxious customers that there is a single 
clearly laid out path into the future that can only be accessed by purchasing the most recent 
products -  and those who do not take this path will be left behind by the rest of the field. 
Manufacturers and marketers seem to assume that, if these self-interested pronouncements are 
repeated sufficiently often, the response of credulous IT users will actually make such predictions 
come true. 
 
As Gates’ The Road Ahead is the most widely read of such attempts to merchandise potentially self-
fulfilling predictions of IT’s future, it is prima facie important to disentangle its rather divergent 
messages. Gates himself is notably inconsistent about both the viability of this futurological 
enterprise, and even to what extent he himself had ever been a successful practitioner of it. In his 
Foreword he comments that the ‘personal computer revolution’ had led he and Paul Allen to places 
they had ‘barely imagined’ back in the mid 1970s.17Nevertheless, Gates soon claims that when he 
was 19 years old ‘I caught sight of the future and based my career on what I saw... I thought we 
could have “a computer on every desk and in every home”’ and that then became Microsoft’s long 
term ‘corporate mission.’18 Strangely, no evidence is cited to support the latter claim, and none can 
be found in any serious history of computing. Like so many autobiographies, The Road Ahead 
retrospectively imposes an artificial teleology on its principal author’s life, giving his career more 
predestined directionality than he could conceivably have experienced in arriving at his current 
fame and fortune.   
 
This book is also a very Microsoft-centred almanac of where computing will go next - allegedly 
taking lessons from history of the alleged ‘PC revolution’ to predict the course of the ‘Internet 
revolution’ so incongruously  unforeseen by Gates. In his Foreword, he is again more modest about 
his capacities to discern the coming developments: of the next ‘great journey’ on which we had now 
all embarked, humbly contending that ‘We can’t be sure exactly where this one will lead either.’ 
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And yet much of The Road Ahead is devoted to offering us three incompatible visions of where this 
next virtual trip will be taking us. 
 
i) technological determinism: One of Gates’ contentions is the technological determinist claim 
that the ‘revolution in communications’ that he expects in the next few decades will be ‘driven’ 
by new developments in IT. These yet to be created tools - miniaturized hardware or so called 
‘killer’ software applications - will meet needs, claims Gates, that we don’t foresee now.19 Thus 
we should undertake whatever new activities are made possible by new technology and show a 
passive deference to their capacities and constraints. To support this vision of how the future 
arrives, he argues from historical precedent that the new possibilities for communication created 
by the fax machine, portable video camera and the Cable news network were important in 
bringing about the fall of communism  - and even of reducing the importance of national 
boundaries in making countries ‘more alike.’20 Yet his language about the agency of technology 
is often ambivalent. Gates is often less than clear about whether new IT applications will actually 
dictate the changes that will bring about a pre-given future, or whether these new applications 
will just create the possibilities of new futures in the hands of imaginative and strategic users. 
Thus, for example, he is less than forthright about whether his proposed wallet PC will be the 
cause and mediator of social change or just the product of it.21 
 
Gates says rather Calvinistically in the first chapter: ‘We don’t have the option of turning away 
from the future’ - as though the future were inescapably predestined by every newly arrived 
technology. Yet he fails to note that the vast majority of technological innovations rapidly 
disappears into obscurity;22 indeed, it is not clear in his account why a small handful of 
‘successful’ innovations in IT could have such a decisive ‘impact’ every year whilst thousands of 
others do not. Equally deterministically Gates adds that ‘No one gets to vote on whether 
technology is going to change our lives’ - as though human beings were incapable of judging 
how - or even whether - any given technology should be deployed to change the operations of the 
world.23 Yet it is at just this point in his account of the inevitability of technology-induced 
change that Gates argues in a completely different vein that ‘No-one can stop productive change
in the long run because the market place inexorably embraces it.’ This leads us to another li
Gatesian futurology viz. that the future of IT is somehow determined by the consumer ‘market’ - 
rather than by the innately progressive nature of technology. 
 
ne of 
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ii) the hegemony of the market:  A prominent theme of Gates’ account, and one that is not 
easily reconciled with the first, is that the fate of information technologies is determined by the 
operations of the ‘market. He argues that since ‘de facto standards’ are developed by the 
marketplace rather than by law, they get chosen for the ‘right reasons’ and are later replaced for 
similarly good reasons when ‘something better’ shows up.24 Interestingly he contends here that 
‘killer applications’ do not automatically win over IT users - as his account in i) would suggest: 
in fact he redefines a “killer app” as a use of technology so attractive to consumers that it ‘fuels 
market forces’ and makes the underlying invention on which it depends ‘all but indispensable’.25 
Gates thus concedes that it is only the efficacy of consumer market forces that transforms 
potential killer applications from being mere ‘curiosities’ into ‘money-making essentials’ - not 
their inherent technological virtues.26 Tellingly, he concedes that the difficulty of predicting 
consumer take-up of new products might conceivably lead to Microsoft ceasing to be top 
software company unless it  keeps innovating its way to stay on the front-line27. Thus on this 
account, the state of future IT is very much in the hands of human beings, not in the technologies 
that they use (see more below). 
 
iii) implementing justice: Further complication is generated for the reader of The Road Ahead 
by Gates’ pronouncement that everyone should have a say in how IT is developed and for whose 
benefit. He proposes that ‘broad groups’ of the population, not just technologists and IT 
specialists, should be able participate in the debate about how this new technology ‘should be 
shaped’ and how it will in turn ‘shape society.’ This proposed inclusiveness is difficult, however, 
to reconcile with his claim28 that those who resist new forms of technology will inevitably cave 
in and learn to accept whatever IT manufacturers produce for them. Critical readers can bit 
wonder at his claims that new developments in IT will bring about greater democracy and 
freedom - indeed apparently at first only to the English-speaking world.29 Although he dismisses
the naive utopian view that IT will eliminate ‘all barriers of inequality and prejudice,’ he 
nevertheless rather idealistically claims that we are ‘all created equal’ in the virtual world, and
that we can accordingly use this to redress some of the inequalities in the physical world.’
 
 
 
30 In 
particular he is concerned that there is still a considerable ‘gender imbalance’ in computing: his 
response to this is that we must pay  ‘particular attention’ to increase the number of women 
participating in professional computing. Quite how this moral intervention in IT promotion is to
be reconciled with a deference to the market forces creed he advocates as in (ii) above and also 
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the determining power of technology to propel us into a better future as advocated in (i), is not at 
stice 
e) 
nd here 
 technology. Interestingly, 
though it is Gates’ concession to the importance of IT users that gives us some hope that 
possibility. 
all easy to see.  
 
If Gates is serious in his claim that there ought to be a mechanism for implementing social ju
by mass social consultation in the development of IT, the future would be governed entirely by 
what IT users wanted. However, not only does Gates not offer a mechanism by which  such 
justice might be implemented, he does not even begin to consider the problems of achieving any 
consensus about technological needs for the future when a vast number of diverse users are 
consulted. Without an encyclopaedic knowledge of the interests and concerns of different social 
groups, it would surely be exceedingly difficult for anyone to predict which (or perhaps whos
future of IT would be engendered in any confluence of different perspectives. Again we fi
no cogent means of establishing accurate forecasts of information
responsible technological forecasting might still be a 
 
3. The power of users to select the Roads Ahead   
Any viable futurology would have to undertake something potentially disturbing to the vanity o
those who work in the IT industry. We should disaggregate the homogenizing fiction of the
‘market’ and  look in detail at the heterogeneous range of present day users of IT as the major 
determinant of IT’s future - albeit within the constraints of what software and hardware is 
commercially available to them. In order to see how the future of IT might be created, we should 
thus look more closely at the socio-cultural dynamics of diverse technology users.  Mackenzie an
Wajcman’s account of the social shaping of technology shows how human decisions - which make 
little reference to engineering merit - are crucial to selecting which technologies ever get beyond 
being mere ‘promising’ innovations.  In their more radical programme of the social construction
technology, Pinch and Bijker have argued that contingent social decision-making goes on a
stage in the making of a new technology. They argue, for example, that the success of the equal-
wheeled, pneumatic tyred, rear-driven bicycle in 1890s Britain cannot be explained by the 
conventional claim that it was the uniquely best technical solution to which all rational cyclists 
adapted; they cla
f 
 
d 
 of 
t every 
im rather that this design was developed over several decades to incorporate 
nough versatility to meet all the resiliently different needs of cyclists of both sexes, all ages and all 
31
32
e
social classes.33 
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The rise and proliferation of the personal computer can also be told as the incorporation of p
existing social interests and practices into an extraordinarily versatile technological entity. It
well-known that the esoteric Altair 8800 electronic kit computer of 1975 used only by self-
indulgent hobbyists was the ancestor for the sophisticated mass-produced IBM compatible, 
Windows-operating multi-purpose PC of the 1990s. Recently Aspray and Campbell-Kelly have 
refined this story to emphasize that entrepreneurs and whizz-kids such as the young Bill Gates, 
Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak had to draw heavily upon popular culture and commerce to find 
useful purposes for the proto-PC to serve. Going far beyond the calculational and programm
functions that had been the stock-in-trade of the electronic mainframe computer since World War 
II, the extremely protean microcomputer was subsequently moulded by them into whatever 
multiform role could be marketed to fit in to the daily social existence of businesses, educational
establishments and affluent populations. All these computer usages  related to existing social 
practices for which there were
re-
 is 
able 
 
 well-defined  - albeit predominantly male, middle-class and able-
n, electronic 
is sort of multi-user versatility for the micro-computer was established as 
ommercially viable in 1980 did IBM need to bother to join the game of constructing futures for 
 
 have 
e extraordinary global take-up of the constantly re-invented PC as long ago as 1975. We 
an conclude that prudent IT futurologists should perhaps restrict themselves to short-range 
 
 
t, any 
bodied - consumer audiences in the late 1970s: word-processing, spreadsheets, educatio
games, graphic design, etc. 34 
Only when th
c
this device.  
 
Despite Gates’ claims to the contrary, the question remains: could anyone really have predicted that 
the stolidly unentertaining and self-referential Altair computer could have been so effectively 
wedded to so many extant social practices - or indeed guessed to which social practices - and sold to
so many millions of people within two decades? Surely not even the shrewdest polymathic expert in 
cultural anthropology, electronics, advertising and the sociology of business could accurately
predicted th
c
prophesy.  
 
Yet even with regard to the imminent future, Aspray and Campbell-Kelly conclude cautiously
‘What will happen is hard to predict. Nothing is certain but change.’35 Nevertheless, the general
thrust of their argument is that the future of computing is tied up closely with the outcome of 
corporate power rivalries between Microsoft, Apple, IBM and some of the newly emerging IT 
companies. Whilst understanding the dynamics of ‘corporate’ power is doubtless importan
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deep analysis of it  must surely explain how such power is necessarily rooted in a company’s ability 
to enrol the contingent interests and sympathies of IT users. One important genre of such 
scholarship lies is the feminist analyses which point to the decades of predominance of men among 
ose who have shaped the forms and uses of IT products - despite the very close involvement of 
way at 
n 
cognise that the fates of information technologies lie not in the 
inds, spreadsheets nor marketing tactics of their creators, but rather in the shifting power relations 
********* 
Author’s  Address: Division of History & Philosophy of Science, School of Philosophy, 
University of Leeds
th
skilled women as the programmers of several of the first computers in the 1940s and 1950s. 
 
Gill Kirkup thus asks whether the computer need be a self-indulgent ‘hammer’ for battering a
male-orientated problems: could its potentialities not be better fulfilled as that of a creative 
harmonious ‘harpsichord’?36  She concludes her piece with some optimism that a new set of 
intellectual and emotional values might be invested in future social (re)constructions of the 
computer that will turn it into a more positive, sensitive and creative instrument. Certainly if 
hitherto marginalized social groups come in the future to have much more power in setting the 
agendas for both the design and usage of information technology, the ‘Road Ahead’ for informatio
technology might very well take a different path from that envisaged by Bill Gates. Do futurologists 
have any option therefore but to re
m
of their active and diverse users? 
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